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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Two Strikes: American Intervention in Haiti

Author: Major Kent D. Simon, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Although the U.S. campaigns in Haiti were not a traditional military campaign they do represent the type of operation that U.S. forces can expect to be called on to accomplish in the future. To succeed in these future conflicts the U.S. military must understand and recognize both its successes and failures in previous operations.

Discussion: The U.S. attempted to militarily restore order in Haiti twice in the 20th century, both times with mixed results. In each case the campaigns short-term objectives were accomplished but a permanent solution to the Haiti's internal problems and the threat those problems present to U.S. national security has yet to be accomplished. Haiti and the military operations in Haiti can serve as an example for future U.S. operations in failed states or states on the brink of collapse. To succeed in these future conflicts the U.S. military must understand and recognize both its successes and failures in previous operations. While operationally successful, in two attempts, the U.S. failed to resolve the potential problem that Haiti presents to U.S. security interest. U.S. operations in 1915 restored brought order to Haiti and provided a baseline for the development of a stable government. Operation Uphold Democracy provided Haiti with a glimmer of hope for a brighter future but U.S. domestic political concerns ended the mission well before strategic success was possible.

Conclusion: In Haiti, the U.S. turned to military power to quickly eliminate a threat to the nation's security. While military operations were successful, follow on operations were not, and today Haiti retains the potential to implode into crises. Without an end-state, supporting efforts by other elements of national power and a long-term non-military engagement plan the U.S. will likely revisit Haiti and other states that are in crises. The key to ensuring the success of operations in failed or failing states lies with the execution of "joint" operations involving military power as one element of the total effort aimed at an identified and obtainable goal.

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ABSTRACT

The United States has executed military operations in Haiti twice in the past 100 years. On both occasions the short term objectives of these operations have been fulfilled by the military. Despite these successes Haiti remains a strategic security concern and a state on the verge of collapse. The fundamental failure of the U.S. to resolve Haiti's internal problems as well as the threat these problems present to the United States is the result of a misunderstanding of the historical context that precipitated the crises and a short sighted political policy. This paper examines the historical context that created a perpetual state of political and social crises in Haiti and examines the successes and failures of U.S. military operations in the country. As the worlds remaining super power the U.S. will increasingly be called upon to intervene in failed or failing states. The lessons learned in Haiti may provide a partial template for success in future operations.

PREFACE

The author is greatly indebted to Colonel Robert Wagner and Doctor Craig Swanson, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, for their assistance in writing this paper. Major General Tom Jones, USMC and Mr. Pat Murphy, U.S. Department of State gave valuable time and provided insight into Haiti and U.S. operations in that country that are unavailable in published sources. The staff of the Marine Corps University Research Center provided invaluable assistance in finding reference material and resources for this paper. Any and all errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

PURPOSE

"Since the end of the Cold War, the definition of foes and the delineation of national security goals has been anything but clear cut."¹ Although the U.S. campaigns in Haiti were not a traditional military campaign they do represent the type of operation that U.S. forces can expect to be called on to accomplish in the future. The U.S. attempted to militarily restore order in Haiti twice in the 20th century, both times with mixed results. In each case the campaigns short-term objectives were accomplished but a permanent solution to the Haiti's internal problems and the threat those problems present to U.S. national security has yet to be accomplished. Haiti and the military operations in Haiti can serve as an example for future U.S. operations in failed states or states on the brink of collapse. To succeed in these future conflicts the U.S military must understand and recognize both its successes and failures in previous operations.

This paper will examine the historical events leading up to the United States military interventions in Haiti in 1915 and in 1994 and the interventions themselves. This examination will

¹ Richard Millet, "A Multiplicity of Threats, A Paucity of Options: The Global Security Environment at the End of the Twentieth Century" in *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations*. Eds Max G. Manwaring and Anthony James Joes (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 5.

attempt to identify those events and actions that facilitated success and those that resulted in failure.

INTRODUCTION

Haiti is located in the Caribbean approximately 60 miles south of Cuba. The country occupies the western one-third of the island of Hispaniola. The country is divided into three regions by five mountain ranges; the highest altitude is 2,715 meters. The climate is tropical with a wet season, February to May, and a dry season, November to January, temperatures range from 15 to 35 degrees Celsius.²


The country's population, estimated at 7.2 million in 1988, is primarily black and mulatto. The principal language is Creole, although the mulatto elite also speaks French and English. With the exception of the elite, the vast majority of the population is illiterate, with 65 percent of the population receiving no formal education. Malaria, tuberculosis and typhoid are endemic to Haiti and infant mortality averages close to 15 percent.³

The economy, with the lowest GDP in the Western Hemisphere, is primarily based agriculture, with coffee as the principal export crop. Despite employing over 65 percent of the labor force, Haiti's agricultural output is not sufficient to meet basic subsistence requirements. The capital, Port-au-Prince is the leading commercial port and has the only fully functional

² Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, *Dominican Republic and Haiti Country Studies* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989), 196.

³ Ibid, 197.

hard surface airport in the country, there is one commercial railroad designed to transport sugarcane and no passenger rail service. Communications services are concentrated in Port-au-Prince and are virtually non-existent in the remainder of the country.⁴



⁴ Ibid, 197.

⁵ Embassy of the Republic of Haiti, Washington, D.C.
<http://www.haiti.org/map.htm>

COLONIAL HERITAGE 1492-1804

Martin Alonjso Pinzon, Captain of the *Pinta*, discovered the island of Hispaniola on 1 December 1492.⁶ Five days later Columbus ordered the first Europeans ashore at Mole St. Nicholas, a location that would factor into Haiti's history for the next 300 hundred years. It was from this initial landing and the first contact with the native Taino Indians that Haiti received its name, Hayti, meaning mountains.

Following Columbus's landings the Spanish colonized the island and introduced sugar cane as the primary cash crop. Cane farming quickly became the economic center of the colony. Cane farming is a labor-intensive operation and the Spanish utilized the indigenous Indian population as a slave labor force. Smallpox, imported from Europe, rapidly decimated the Indian population and by 1502 the Spanish were facing a sever labor shortage.⁷

In order to maintain the profitability of the colony the Spanish authorized the importation of African slaves to replace the Indian work force. Spain continued to import African slaves into Haiti and the colony was maintained as a relatively prosperous agricultural enterprise. The successful conquest of Central and South America and the rich mineral wealth associated

with these colonies reduced the importance of Haiti to the Spanish crown. With their military resources stretched to the limit, the Spanish did little to oppose the establishment of a French colony in the unoccupied western Hispaniola. The French colony was established by privateers and served as a base of operations for piracy in the Caribbean.⁸

By 1653, the French solidified their control over western Hispaniola and the colony began to expand and develop a thriving agricultural industry.⁹ With the growing wealth of the colony and increasingly large areas of land devoted to sugar cane production, the French to begin to import African slaves. In 1658 Louis XIV codified French slavery in the Americas with the *Edit Touchant la Police de l' Amerique Francaise*, popularly known as the Code Noir.¹⁰ The Code Noir attempted to establish circumstances that would create enduring conditions for slaves. In application the code created condition for slaves that were far more brutal than any in the world. The conditions of Africans transported to the French colony were described by Vastey, secretary to Henry Christophe, one of Haiti's early independence leaders in the following passage,

⁶ Robert D. Heinl and Nancy Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492 - 1971* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1978), 10

⁷⁷Ibid, 13

⁸ Ibid, 18

⁹ Maurice DeYoung, *Man and Land in the Haitian Economy* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1958), 18

¹⁰ Heinl and Heinl, 26

*Have they not hung up men with heads downward, drowned them in sacks, crucified them on planks, buried them alive, crushed them in mortars? Have they not forced them to eat shit? And, after having flayed them with the lash, have they not cast them alive to be devoured by worms, or onto anthills, or lashed them to stakes in the swamp to be devoured by mosquitoes? Have they not thrown them into boiling caldrons of cane syrup? Have they not put men and women inside barrels studded with spikes and rolled them down mountainsides into the abyss? Have they not consigned these miserable blacks to man-eating dogs until the latter, sated by human flesh, left the mangled victims to be finished off with bayonet and poniard?*¹¹

In addition to its brutality, the Code Noir created a mechanism that allowed whites to free their illegitimate offspring.¹² The mulatres or mulattos were to become a distinctive third class in Haitian society.¹³ Most mulattos, the children of white fathers and slave mothers, were free men with a social standing far above their black mothers but far below their white fathers.

The harsh conditions slaves in Haiti were subjected to resulted in numerous slave rebellions. By 1785, another segment had emerged in Haitian society, the maroon.¹⁴ The Maroons were escaped slaves who lived in the mountains of the country as outlaws. The growth of the Maroons coincided with the increasing importance of Haiti to France. By 1791, Haiti's exports to France were estimated at forty-one million dollars

¹¹ Ibid, 27

¹² Ibid, 27

¹³ DeYoung, 43

and the net worth of the colony at three hundred million dollars.¹⁵

This vital element of the French colonial empire constantly bordered on the verge of explosion. Thirty thousand whites exercised control over a slave population in excess of seven hundred thousand with twenty-five thousand mulattos caught between the two.¹⁶ Fearful of a slave revolt the Europeans enacted even harsher measures against their slaves and France begin to dramatically increase the size and strength of her military forces based in the country.

In 1791, Haiti erupted into violence as slaves across the colony rose up against their masters.¹⁷ The brutality of the revolt was equal to the conditions that the slaves lived under and atrocities were the order of the day as the French tried to regain control over the colony and the slaves sought their freedom. France, in the throws of revolution, responded to the events in Haiti with a strange range of military and political means. While the French colonist, demanded immediate military reinforcement the new republican assembly debated the rights and liberties of all men regardless of race.¹⁸

¹⁴ Heinl and Heinl, 37

¹⁵ Ibid, 41

¹⁶ Ibid, 52

¹⁷ Ibid, 52

¹⁸ Ibid, 68

With the colony in chaos, both England and Spain sought to capitalize on the French inability to reassert control over the colony. England and Spain landed troops in French territory and divided Haiti between them. Spain, still controlling the eastern portions of Hispaniola, received the northern and western interior portions of the colony while the English received the coast and southern portions of Haiti. Pressed by the English, Spanish and the growing strength of the slave revolt, now led by a charismatic former slave named Toussaint, the French colonial administrator published a decree that freed the slaves in the areas of the colony occupied by the English and Spanish.¹⁹

Before this action's impact was felt in the colony events in Europe intervened. The victory of Republican France over Spain resulted in the Spanish concession of the whole of Hispaniola to France. Spanish troops were directed to occupy the island until France could transport sufficient troops to the colony to take possession of it.²⁰

At the start of 1795 The Island of Hispaniola was occupied by the French, the Spanish, serving as a custodial force for the French, the English and a growing force of free slaves under the command of Toussaint.²¹ The English, allied with the French colonist who feared that a victory by Republican France would

¹⁹ Ibid, 73

²⁰ Ibid, 74

²¹ Ibid, 73

result in an end to the slave trade, represented the greatest threat to the islands free slaves. The free slaves realized that a French victory could result in the end of the slave trade. A victory by the British would ensure that slave holding would remain for the foreseeable future.²² Toussaint, now employing deserters from the Republican French forces to train his growing army set out to destroy the British and drive them into the sea.²³

British forces on the island were suffering from a degradation of combat power almost from the moment of their arrival. Tropical disease reduced many units fighting strength to less than fifty percent within weeks of their arrival. Still the British were firmly in control of Port-au-Prince, already the principal city in the western portion of the colony and fully intended to take the colony from France. The British campaign to take the colony lasted through March of 1797, when after spending three million pounds and the lives of over eight thousand soldiers the British effectively abandoned their campaign.²⁴

The end of the British campaign found the entire island in a bizarre political and social condition. The French Republican administrator had appointed Toussaint as the a lieutenant

²² Ibid, 75

²³ Ibid, 78

²⁴ Ibid, 79

governor of the colony, slaves in some portions of the island had been freed while others were still subjugated on the plantations, French, Spanish and free slave garrisons dotted the country and the planter society had armed itself to the teeth and were fully prepared to fight to retain the status quo. Into this mix, republican France sent a new set of colonial administrators who were instructed to pacify rather than conquer the colony.²⁵

French plans to restore their colonial position immediately ran afoul of Toussaint, now supported by the British, quickly began to overwhelm French garrisons and by 1800 Toussaint had established control over the entire island. The final challenge to growing independence came with the Peace of Amiens, with England and France no longer actively at war France determined to make a final effort to regain control of her colony. Napoleon dispatched Captain-General Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc with instruction to "Rid us of these gilded Africans".²⁶

In January of 1802 the French, supported by the Spanish and the Dutch landed on Hispaniola and prepared to execute their campaign of pacification.²⁷ Toussaint and his principle generals, including a rising and brutal leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines, reacted by falling back into the mountains, burning

²⁵ Ibid, 92

²⁶ Ibid, 101

²⁷ Ibid, 108

towns and killing whites along the way. The French quickly advanced into the countryside and secured the major ports and what remained of the countries town and cities. Toussaint responded with guerrilla warfare. By August, endemic diseases and poor sanitation one hundred French soldiers were dieing a day and atrocities, intended to intimidate the black population were swelling the ranks of Toussaint's forces. In June of 1802, Toussaint was captured by the French and consigned to exile where he died.²⁸

The death of Toussaint signaled the beginning of a new war, Jean-Jacques Dessalines succeeded Toussaint, as the ferocity and brutality on both sides reached new heights. The French, decimated by disease began to fall back to their costal strong holds and finally evacuated their reaming forces in 1804. The last French efforts cost Napoleon more casualties than he lost at Waterloo.²⁹

Dessalines's proclamation and declaration of Independence signaled the end of the worlds only successful slave revolt and the beginnings of a new country, the first black republic in the world and the second independent nation in the western hemisphere.³⁰

²⁸ Ibid, 112

²⁹ Ibid, 113

³⁰ Ibid, 123

111 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 1804-1915

Although independent, Haiti had no institutions of government other than Dessalines and his generals; Haiti was, "A crowd, not a nation, a multitude of slaves liberated pell-mell by violent means."³¹ Dessalines first official acts were directed at dealing with the whites that remained in the country. Initially Dessalines followed Toussaints example and was content with voiding the property titles of the whites that remained.³² Toussaint had understood that without the administrative and managerial skills of the Europeans Haiti would be hard pressed to establish a government that was legitimate in the eyes of the world and to rebuild an economy that had been shattered by the struggle for independence.

However, by February of 1804 it became clear that Dessalines perceived the white establishment as a threat to his power and he began to systematically rid the country of Europeans.³³ Initially 200 whites were massacred in Jeremie and from there Dessalines's forces fanned out across the country killing all Europeans without regard to their status, age or sex. By the end of April Dessalines was able to proclaim,

³¹ Walter H. Posner, *The American Occupation of Haiti: Background and Formative Period* (Gunnison CO; Western State College of Colorado, NPD), 5

³² Heinl and Heinl, 127

³³ Ibid, 128-131

*Yes, we have repaid these cannibals, war for war, crime for crime, outrage for outrage. I have saved my country, I have avenged the Americas. Never again shall colonist or Europeans set foot on this soil as master or landowner.*³⁴

Dessalines's actions set the stage for the next one hundred years in Haiti. Without merchants, teachers, agricultural managers or government administrators Haiti was destined to exist as a barter state ruled by the gun. In addition, Haiti was isolated from the rest of the world.

Dessalines divided the population into three groups: the army, laborers, and farm workers. The focus of the nations actions was to prevent the return of Europeans and the reinstating of slavery.³⁵ Dessalines created a state of free men who were treated little better than slaves and replaced the white hierarchy of planters with his own generals. On 8 October 1804, Dessalines codified his rule when he declared himself emperor and declared Haiti the "Empire of the Noirs."³⁶ As emperor, Dessalines ratified a constitution that vested all state power in the hands of the emperor and divided the country into four regions, each controlled by a general of the army.³⁷

As the remnants of the economy disintegrated, the generals begin to plot against each other and Dessalines, as each sought to expand his hold on the dwindling wealth of the country. In

³⁴ Ibid, 129

³⁵ Ibid, 132

³⁶ Ibid, 134 - 138

1806, the southern administrative region exploded in open revolt. Dessalines attempts to regain control over the region resulted in his death. Establishing a pattern in Haitian politics Dessalines was killed by his own generals and hacked into pieces, his corpse was dragged through the streets of Port-au-Prince and displayed in front of the national palace.³⁸

After Dessalines's death, the country was thrown into turmoil as the generals each sought to strengthen and expand their holdings. Eventually Alexander Sabas Petion declared himself president of the Republic of Haiti with control over the south and western districts of the country. In the north, Henery Christophe declared himself King of Northern Kingdom of Haiti. Haiti remained divided between a Northern Kingdom and a Southern Republic until Christophe's death in 1820. Aided by ambitious northern officers Petion's successor Jean-Pierre Boyer was able to unify the country.³⁹

Under Boyer's rule, Haiti's independence was finally recognized by France at a cost of a huge indemnity that required nearly all of Haiti's meager customs revenues to pay.⁴⁰ Haiti continued to decline; its once great cane estates reduced to ruin and subsistence farming and its government institutions

³⁷ Ibid, 134 - 138

³⁸ Ibid, 139

³⁹ Ibid, 162

⁴⁰ Ibid, 169

focusing greater and greater energy towards remaining in power.

The Army remained the central political institution,

*Reinforcing Haitian traditions going back to 1804 when there was no government only an army, officers ran most of the country. Each department came under a general; each town had its General de Place. With unquestioned powers of life, death and larceny, these worthies ruled all that they surveyed.*⁴¹

The social structures, such as they were, that developed favored the mulattos; the only segment of society with any level of education. Social stratification returned to what it had been before independence with those of lighter skin at the top and the noir, dark African, at the bottom.

In 1843, Boyer was overthrown by Charles Riviere Herard, yet another general seeking to enlarge his personal fortune.⁴²

During the solidification of Herard's rule, the inhabitants of the former Spanish colony of Dominica revolted and established the Dominican Republic. Attempts to regain control over Dominica further exasperated Haiti's economy and eventually a series of military defeats coupled with the drain on national resources secured both the independence of the Dominican Republic and the downfall of Herard.⁴³

Haitian politics continued to follow the repetitive course of strong man replacing strong man, society became even more polarized as the mulatto elite and the noir peasants each sought

⁴¹ Ibid, 175

to grab the greater share of power. In 1862, the United States formally recognized Haiti and began to seek land rights for a coaling station at Mole Saint Nicolas.⁴⁴ Growing interest in and expansion of United States political and business interest in the Caribbean and Latin America coupled with yet another revolution were shortly to coincide to alter the course of both United States and Haitian history and formally begin a relationship that continues today.

Increasing interest in the Caribbean by Germany, German efforts to secure rights to establish a coaling station in the vicinity of Mole St. Nicholas and continued instability in Haitian politics combined to create a serious strategic political concern over the future of the country in the United States. With a preponderance of the foreign capital invested in the country and a concern for growing European encroachment into the country the United States landed Marines in Haiti to secure the reserves of the Haitian National Bank in 1912.⁴⁵ The overthrow of President Gulliam Sam and the belief that Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, an ardent anti-American leader back by a strong

⁴² Posner, 14

⁴³ Ibid, 22

⁴⁴ Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 44 -55

⁴⁵ Arthur Millspaugh, *Haiti Under American Control* (Westport CT: Negro Universities Press, 1970) , 20 - 25

army of Cacos, would seize power spurred the United States into action in 1915.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Ibid, 28

FIRST UNITED STATES INTERVENTION 1915-1934

The United States begin moving towards direct intervention in Haiti as early as 1912 and the Navy Department developed contingency plans in 1914 for the occupation of the country. Although far from being finished products these plans indicated that the Department of the Navy recognized both the official strategic policy of the American government as well as the "grayer" links between American business interest and stability in the Caribbean. The situation described in this draft order,

The government has been overthrown; all semblance of law and order has ceased; the local authorities admit their inability to protect foreign interest, the city being overrun and in the hands of about 5,000 soldiers and civilian mobs.⁴⁷

Indicates that the naval planners had a relatively realistic idea of the conditions that they would be required to deal with and the situations that would allow the American government to justify and occupation of a sovereign state.

On 28 July 1915, Naval forces under Rear Admiral William B. Caperton landed in Haiti.⁴⁸ The Initial objectives of the operation were to secure the American, French, British and German legations. A priority was given to providing security for European diplomatic interest to prevent these countries from

⁴⁷NA, War Portfolio No. 1 Reference No. 5-D: Republic of Haiti, United States Naval Department Nov 9 1914. Quoted in Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971) 64

introducing troops into the country.⁴⁹ The initial landing force consisted of two companies of Marines and a battalion of sailors. The landing force quickly secured the legations and other key facilities in and around Port-au-Prince. Key facilities were defined as those properties or facilities that were owned wholly or in part by either American or European business interest.

There was little Haitian resistance to the landing and with the exception of periodic harassment from Caco snipers; the force was not engaged in combat operations. Two sailors were killed during the first night of the occupation by friendly fire.⁵⁰ Shortly after the landing Caperton cabled Washington and reported,

U.S. has now actually accomplished a military intervention in affairs of another nation. Hostility exists now in Haiti and has existed for a number of years against such action. Serious hostiles contacts have only been avoided by prompt and rapid military action which has given the U.S. control before resistance has had time to organize.⁵¹

Caperton's landing force was quickly reinforced with elements of the 1st Marine Brigade from the U.S Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay Cuba.⁵² With additional troops arriving Caperton begin to send heavily armed detachments out of Port-au-Prince to

⁴⁸ Schmidt, 67

⁴⁹ Schmidt, 68 - 71

⁵⁰ Ibid, 70

⁵¹ Senate Hearings, 1922 quoted in Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971) 68

other population centers and to expand military control over Haitian customs houses. Arrangements were put in to place to directly transfer customs duties to the Banque National, the Haitian national bank was now almost completely owned by a consortium of American banks.⁵³ Customs duties were used to pay bond and direct loan payments to American and European investors before they were distributed to the Haitian government. Navy pay corps officers and Marines established military control across the island with guidance to maintain law and order and directly supervise and direct the collection of customs duties.

Although Caperton recommended the establishment of a military government, the Wilson administration determined that a client Haitian government would be established.⁵⁴ Working under this directive, Caperton immediately begin to expedite the disarmament of the Caco armies who supported Bobo and were continuing to demand the popular leader be named president. Bobo, a European trained medical doctor was extremely popular with the Haitian peasantry and equally unpopular with the mulatto elite and American business interest. Bobo was an ardent nationalist who had opposed American business interest in Haiti and whose efforts to overthrow Sam prior to the occupation

⁵² Schmidt, 69

⁵³ Millspaugh, 37

⁵⁴ Ibid, 38

were in large part to prevent the landing of American troops and the establishment of an American customs receivership.⁵⁵

Caperton's efforts to marginalize Bobo and find a suitable client president were difficult. The majority of Haiti's leading citizens were reluctant to formally associate themselves with the occupation force. Additionally with the Americans firmly in control of the Haitian customs houses, the traditional right of the President to control the distribution of the governments funds was obviously going to be restricted. Caperton finally found his man, Philippe Dartinguenave, the president of the Haitian senate. Although known, even in Haiti, for his personal corruption Dartinguenave was unabashedly pro-American and his only stated conditions for accepting office was that the American provide protection for himself and his key cabinet officials.

On 12 August 1915, Dartinguenave was formally elected President by the Haitian legislatures, who were informed that their pay would be withheld until a suitable candidate was selected to serve as President.⁵⁶ Dartinguenave's government immediately proved to be inept and on 3 September Caperton declared martial law approved censorship restriction on the press.

⁵⁵ Schmidt, 43

⁵⁶ Millspaugh, 39

In addition to censorship of the media, Caperton's declaration made it possible to try political criminals in American Military Courts. Protected by the occupation forces and a personal bodyguard of nine Marines, Dartinguenave pushed forward with efforts to ratify a treaty between the United States and Haiti that would effectively legalize the continuation of the occupation of the country by American troops. Despite Dartinguenaves support for the treaty, Caperton was again forced to threaten the Haitian Senate with financial repercussions if they failed to ratify the treaty. Fearful of loosing their pay the Haitian senate ratified the treaty in November of 1915, the United States Senate followed suite with unanimous ratification in February of 1916.

The treaty between the United States and Haiti laid out the following principal provisions:

- (1) An American appointed financial advisor and general receiver of customs would continue to control the government's finances.
- (2) Haiti could not modify customs duties or increase public debt without American approval.
- (3) The United States would organize and Officer a Haitian *Gendarmerie*.
- (4) The United States would serve as the arbitrator of foreign claims against Haiti.
- (5) The treaty would remain in force for 10 years.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Treaty Between the United States and Haiti. Finances, Economic Development and Tranquility of Haiti. Signed at Port-au-Prince , September 16, 1915 reprinted in Posner 109-112

With a client president installed and American control of the country legitimized by treaty, Caperton departed from Haiti. Colonel Littleton Waller, commander of the Marine Expeditionary forces in Haiti, replaced Caperton. Waller's assumption of command marked a new phase in the occupation. While Caperton had tried to maintain a cordial relationship with the Haitians, Waller felt that the employment of force was a far more effective method of maintaining order. The American financial advisor in Haiti observed:

We have used two policies in Haiti, one of force and one of conciliation. Admiral Caperton employed conciliation. He made friends of leading Haitians, by associating with them. General Waller, seconded by Colonel Butler, adopted a policy of force.⁵⁸

Waller immediately set out to finish quelling the remnants of the Caco armies that had supported Bobo's bid for Presidency.⁵⁹ Despite the abilities of the Caco's to blend in with the population and their tactical mobility, Waller's heavily armed Marine patrols aggressively pursued them and quickly overcame their resistance. Waller's aggressive combat patrols into the interior of the country coupled with a declaration of amnesty broke the back of organized resistance

⁵⁸ Schmidt, 78

⁵⁹Graham A Cosmas, "Cocoa and Cadillos: Marines and Counterinsurgency in Hispaniola", *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium* (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 293 - 309.

and by early 1917 the entire country was secured and controlled by the occupation forces.

With the country secure Waller's next step was the establishment of a Haitian *Gendarmerie*. Waller appointed one of principle subordinates Major Smedly Butler as the first commandant and Major General of the *Gendarme d' Haiti*.⁶⁰ Butler immediately set about recruiting both Haitians and American Marines for serve in the *Gendarme*. Haitians served as enlisted members of the force while Marine noncommissioned officers were recruited to serve as Officers in the force. While Butler encountered numerous difficulties in recruiting his force, he rapidly established the *Gendarme* as a credible security force and begins to relieve the first Marine Brigade of security duties in the interior of the country.

By late 1917, the *Gendarmerie* had become the principle instrument of control in the country. The first Marine Brigade remained in Port-au-Prince but served primarily as a reserve force should the *Gendarmerie* require support.⁶¹ The Marine who served, as officers in the *Gendarmerie* were the omnipotent rulers of the districts and towns where they were stationed. Dr. S. G. Inmand, An American business leader who visited Haiti in 1918 reported that:

⁶⁰ Millspaugh, 44

⁶¹ Ibid, 47

The Marine who becomes as officer in the *Gendarmire* finds himself clothed with particularly unlimited power in the district where he serves. He is judged of partially all civil and criminal casesHe is paymaster of all funds expended by the national government, he is ex-officio director of the schools, he controls the mayor and the city council.⁶²

In 1918, the American occupation forces and the State Department begin to urge the Haitian legislature to consider a new constitution. The constitution proposed by the United States allowed for foreign ownership of land and real property in Haiti and eliminated restrictions on foreign investment in the economy. The Haitian legislature, unlike the executive branch under Dartinguenave, was not predisposed to support the occupation forces, except when their own pay was threatened, refused to pass the American drafted constitution and drafted their own document that was extremely hostile to foreign business interest. Upon learning of this effort Major Butler, dissolved the Haitian legislature and submitted the constitution to a popular plebiscite. The constitution was overwhelmingly approved by the population in June of 1918 in elections managed by Butler and the Gendarmerie.⁶³

In 1919, the *Gendarme* experienced their first real threat to control of the country. In an effort to improve communications between the various posts and improve the

⁶² Schmidt, 90

⁶³ Ibid, 96-99

mobility of the first Marine Brigade, the *Gendarmerie* set out on an extensive road-building program. In order to provide labor to construct roads Butler directed that an old French practice, still law in Haiti, be reintroduced, the *Corvee'*.⁶⁴ The *Corvee'* required that Haitians work on public works projects in lieu of paying taxes, since most of the population was unable to pay taxes the *Corvee'* provided a huge pool of available labor to the occupation forces.⁶⁵

The Haitians saw the *Corvee'* as the reinstitution of slavery and resistance to it soon led to full-scale revolt. In the mountainous northern interior of the Country, Charlemagne Peralte raised a traditional Caco army numbering close to 10,000. Faced with this threat the *Gendarmerie* turned to the Marines for support. In several bitter fights, Peralte's army was defeated and he himself was killed by Marines. The abuses of Haitians by the Marines and the *Gendarmerie* and questions about atrocities committed by American Forces would lead to a series of congressional investigations and the reorganization of the occupation force in 1921.⁶⁶

The American occupation, although liberalized by some of the reforms generated by the 1921 investigations remained firmly

⁶⁴ Ibid, 100

⁶⁵ Ibid, 106

⁶⁶ Ibid, 109-125

in control of the country through 1929.⁶⁷ During this period, numerous public works programs were completed and foreign capital, assured of a secure environment flowed into the country. However, the Haitians continued to chafe at the controls exerted by the occupation forces. In the spring of 1929 student protest over increases in tuition inflamed the country and the *Gendarme* was once again forced to call on the Marines for support in their efforts to quell riots in both Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, Haiti's second largest city.

The brutal methods used to put down these riots once again resulted in congressional investigations and the call for an end to American occupation of the country. The Forbes Commission, chaired by Cameron Forbes was dispatched to Haiti with a mandate to determine the most efficient means to extract American forces but ensure the soundness of European and American investments in Haiti. Based on the committees recommendations a program of "Haitianization" was immediately undertaken throughout the programs administered by the occupations forces. In July of 1934 President Roosevelt, the first American President to visit Haiti, announced that the last American troops would leave Haiti by 15 August 1934. On 1 August 1934, control of the *Gendarmerie*

⁶⁷ Ibid, 221

was officially passed to its first Haitian Commander and on 15 August 1934, the remaining Marines left Haiti.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Ibid, 230

POST INTERVENTION PROGRESS AND DECLINE 1934 - 1994

The departure of the Marines hailed the rapid deterioration of both accomplishments. The Gendarme quickly became the dominant power broker in Haitian politics as the works projects directed by the occupation forces fell into disrepair. As Haitian politics returned to its authoritarian roots the Gendarme gave up its police responsibilities to locally appointed political constabularies and reshaped itself as the *Force Armie d Haiti* (FadH) and remained the central figure in Haitian politics until 1957.⁶⁹

The election of Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) as President of Haiti in October of 1957 temporarily ended the FadH's political power. Papa Doc, fearful of the traditional Haitian political process, a coup, quickly dismantled the remnants of the Marine trained army and established his own ultra loyal security forces, the *Volontaires de la Securite Nationale* (VSN) to fill the security vacuum. The VSN, popularly known as the TonTon Macoutes, supported Papa Doc's rule until his death in 1971. Official estimates of VSN killings during Papa Doc's rule range from 22,000 to 50,000.⁷⁰

After the death of Papa Doc his successor and son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) ruled the country until February of

⁶⁹.Heinl and Heinl, 589

1986 when the combined forces of Haitian frustration, the United States Government and international opinion finally forced him to leave the country for asylum in France. Baby Doc was replaced by a civil-military council (CNG) led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy.⁷¹ The departure of the last Duvalier resulted in the retreat of the VSN from their role as the country's principle security force and political strong arm. With a general serving as the true head of state and the VSN no longer a serious threat the FAdH quickly resumed its historic role in the political life of the country.

The CNG initially received strong support from both the United States and the international community. International opinion quickly began to turn to condemnation as it became apparent that Namphy's goals were merely Haitian politics as usual. Rather than seeking to democratize the political process, Namphy's efforts were aimed at centralizing power and control. With a loss of international support and growing internal criticism, the Namphy sought to pacify both world opinion and internal dissidents by endorsing a national referendum on a new constitution 1987.⁷²

Prior to the 1987 constitutional referendum, the principle liberal opposition groups formed a left of center coalition, the

⁷⁰ Heinl and Heinl, 664

⁷¹. John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998)

National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Organizations (NCCDO).⁷³ This group drawing its support primarily from the Haitian poor and disenfranchised was able to mount a significant challenge to the political elite during constitutional debates. Fearful of the potential power behind the NCCDO the constitution that emerged from debate was extremely liberal and progressive. In addition to its success with the constitution, the debates leading up to the referendum provided a stage for one of the NCCDO's rising leaders, a young Catholic priest Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Father Aristide's political views were expressed in the rising tide of liberal Catholic thought known as liberation theology. Preaching land reform, workers rights and championing the under class Father Aristide's popularity quickly thrust to the front of the NCCDO.⁷⁴

Under the auspices of the new constitution, presidential elections were held in January of 1988. Rife with fraud, graft and corruption and controlled by the FadH, and its leader Namphy, the elections produced a former Duvalier minister, Leslie Manigat as the final victor. Manigat's government ended with a military coup, the result of the president attempts to muscle in on the FadH's import kickbacks. Internal power struggles, with the army as the principle referee, continued

⁷². Ibid, 41

⁷³. Ibid, 43

⁷⁴ Ibid, 50

through the presidential elections in February of 1991. The 1991 elections, supervised by the United States and former President Carter, produced an overwhelming victory for the NCCDO and its popular leader, Father Aristide.⁷⁵

Aristide's populist policies and appeal to the lower and principally black masses threatened the elite and principally mulatto social and military elite and in September of 1991 the Aristide government was overthrown by a military coup lead by Lieutenant General Raul Cedras the commander of the FAdH. The United States, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN), despite growing U.S. concerns about Aristide's ability to govern and increasingly leftist philosophy, condemned Aristide's overthrow. Unshaken by international condemnation the Cedras quickly begin the process of dismantling their opposition using wide spread oppressive measures. Cedras's actions resulted in a flood of Haitians seeking to escape from the island and the U.S.'s ability to intercept, detain and repatriate them was quickly stretched to the point of failure.⁷⁶

Galvanized by the flood of refugees and growing internal political pressures to support Aristide, the U.S. pursued the institution of international economic sanctions through the UN.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 43

⁷⁶ Ibid, 50

In June of 1993, the UN instituted an embargo of arms and oil against Haiti in an attempt to force Cedras from power. With sanctions providing no significant impact the U.S. attempted to broker diplomatic solution to the growing crises in July of 1993. The resulting 10-point Governors Island Agreement provided for the "retirement" of Cedras and the return of Aristide to power. Under the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement the 220 UN peacekeepers, primarily U.S. and Canadian, deployed to Haiti aboard the *USS HARLAN COUNTY*. Upon there arrival the ship and its lightly armed force was prevented from docking by paramilitary forces loyal to Cedras and the FAdH.⁷⁷ With the failure of the Governors Island Agreement and under increasing pressure from congress to resolve the Haitian crises the President and Secretary of Defense ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to prepare a plan to return Aristide to power through the use of military force.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ibid, 51

⁷⁸ Ibid, 51

SECOND UNITED STATES INTERVENTION 1994-1997

After centuries of authoritarian rule, broken only by 19 years of U.S occupation, Haitians elected a liberal former priest, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, president in February 1991. In September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown by a military coup. The United Nations, (UN), condemned the coup and the U.S. vowed to return Aristide to power.

Despite the misgivings of many in the U.S. intelligence community about Aristide and his legitimately questionable humanitarian record the U.S. was committed to the restoration of the democratically elected Haitian government. In addition, many in both the diplomatic and intelligence communities felt that the only way to stem the flow of illegal immigration from the island was through the restoration of Aristide. Pressures from the international community and congress, particularly the Congressional Black Caucus, mounted on the President and the resultant order to CJCS directed that a safe and secure environment be established that would permit the reestablishment of the legitimate government of Aristide.⁷⁹ Strategically, the President, continued to work through the U.N., the OAS and other diplomatic channels to secure some type of solution that would solve the crises without a commitment of U.S. military forces in

⁷⁹Ibid, 53.

a combat role, the potential for numerous intervention scenarios led to the requirement to plan for multiple military contingencies.

Additionally the President and Secretary of Defense were extremely concerned about creating a situation that could result in a "Somalia Scenario" and the resultant negative press for a Presidency that was already considered inept when dealing with military matters. Finally, the legitimacy of any operation with only marginal strategic and security interest at stake was open to severe criticism from the political right both in congress and in the general populous. The strategic setting, while relatively benign, with regards to force correlation and order of battle, was extremely complicated politically. Political concerns had a significant impact on the campaign from its inception to the final withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) was assigned three primary objectives by the President for operations in Haiti:

- (1) establish a safe and secure environment that would permit the reestablishment of the legitimate government of President Aristide.
- (2) Neutralize the FAdH as a threat to the legitimate government.
- (3) protect American and the citizens of other countries.

Although not stated by the NCA a fourth strategic objective was implied, end the flow of migrants seeking to reach the U.S. and return those interned at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GITMO) and other established safe havens to Haiti.⁸⁰ Given these objectives and the reality of ongoing efforts by the State Department and the U.N. to broker a diplomatic solution to the crises, USACOM developed two operational plans each with different operational objectives.

Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370 was designed as a forcible entry option. OPLAN 2370 was designed as a three-phase operation with different objectives during each phase of the campaign. Under phase one of OPLAN 2370, initial U.S. objectives focused on neutralizing the FAdH and securing key communications nodes, in particular the port and airfield in Port-au-Prince.* After initial combat operations secured key infrastructure and eliminated the FAdH as a significant threat phase two objectives shifted to stability operations and objectives designed to prepare to hand over control of the theater to a U.N. peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Although the objectives of phase two were relatively nebulous, they required a significant coordination effort with both other U.S. departments and agencies and with non-governmental agencies

⁸⁰ United States Atlantic Command, *Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti*, n.p., 1997, 2.

represented in the country. One of the most important in preparing to hand over control of the theater was the establishment of a Haitian security force; in this particular case, success required detailed planning and coordination the U.S. State Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Once the U.N. peacekeeping force was established phase three objectives were focused on supporting UNMIH return control of vital government functions to Aristide.⁸¹

OPLAN 2380 was designed as a benign entry option. Under OPLAN 2380, U.S. and multinational forces would come ashore in the country in cooperation with the remaining Haitian security forces. The strategic and operational objectives were the same as OPLAN 2370 with the exception of a requirement to neutralize the FAdH. OPLAN 2380 was focused on establishing a security presence in Haiti, assisting ICITAP in reorganizing a Haitian security service and facilitating the turn over of essential functions to the Arisitide government. These objectives, specifically those relating to cooperation with existing Haitian security forces, were to be problematic at operational and tactical levels of the campaign and were altered dramatically during execution.⁸²

⁸¹ Ibid, 3.

⁸² Ibid, 4.

The U.S. center of gravity, both strategically and operationally, was the willingness of the American people to continue to support military operations in Haiti. As in any military campaign, the President had the requirement of explaining the strategic security requirements that justified expending national resources towards resolving the situation. The immigration and humanitarian crises created by the Haitian military certainly pulled at the heartstrings of American society. However, the President, concerned about his lack of credibility regarding military issues, was clearly not in position to explain either large numbers of casualties or an extended commitment in Haiti to the American public.⁸³

Both U.S. commanders and the FAdH recognized that the will of the American people was the Achilles heel that would allow a relatively unsophisticated military force to, in effect, defeat the U.S. One great concern of U.S. planners was the success that the paramilitary forces had in their efforts to prevent the landing of the HAG in October. Not only had this event embarrassed the President, it galvanized support for Cedras among some moderate elements within Haiti who viewed this event as a victory against the U.S. With October's events and the recent death of 19 Americans in Somalia, the FAdH perceived an

⁸³ Ballard, 68.

opportunity to retain control over the country and intimidate the U.S.⁸⁴

Strategically the FAdH's center of gravity was the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince. In Haiti, as in many third world countries, the political, social and economic life of the country revolves solely around the capital city. A government will be perceived as legitimate by the populous simply by virtue of its ability to control the capital. Communications links, transportation networks, commercial and economic transactions are all centered on the capital city; control of the capital effectively conveys control over these components of society.

Operationally the FAdH's center of gravity was their ability to control the Haitian people. Although relatively few in numbers, poorly armed and with virtually no training the FAdH was able to retain control over the country through fear and intimidation. From its beginnings, the Haitian people had been brutally repressed and a culture of fear permeated the vast majority of the populous. The FAdH's control rested solely in their ability to bully and intimidate. Once the FAdH "lost face" and their vulnerabilities were demonstrated to the Haitian people their control over the country, and potentially their lives were at an end.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Major General Tom Jones, USMC, interview by author, 14 November 2001.

⁸⁵ Ibid

Both the U.S. order of battle and command relationships were complicated from the initial planning stage of the campaign and became more so as the operation progressed. The principle force supporting OPLAN 2370 was Joint Task Force 180 (JTF 180). Admiral Miller, Commander U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) appointed Lieutenant General Shelton, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, to command JTF 180. The headquarters and communications elements for JTF 180 were drawn primarily from the XVII Airborne Corps.⁸⁶

The JTF 180's ground combat power was made up of three elements: a U.S. Army element consisting of two reinforced brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division command by Major General Steele, a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Haiti, commanded by Colonel Tom Jones, and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commanded by Brigadier General Schoomaker. The JSOTF included elements of the U.S Army's Ranger Regiment, Special Forces and Delta Force as well as special operations forces from the U.S. Air Force.⁸⁷

Supporting the ground combat forces were the U.S. Navy's 2nd Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Johnson and a composite U.S. Air Force component built around the 12th Air Force, commanded by Major General Record. In addition to these service components,

⁸⁶ Ballard, 69.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 93.

CJTF 180 was supported by a joint civil-military operations task force commanded by Brigadier General Potter. Because of the strategic political concerns of the NCA a battalion drawn from multiple Caribbean nations, the Caribbean Command Battalion (CARICOM) was assigned to CJTF 180 and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Graham, Jamaican Defense Forces.⁸⁸

Designed as a follow on force for phase two of OPLAN 2370, or, the principle force executing OPLAN 2380, JTF 190 was commanded by Major General Meade, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division. Like JTF 180, the headquarters and communications elements for JTF 190 were drawn from the staff and headquarters sections of the 10th Mountain Division. This proved to be problematic for JTF 190. The 10th Mountain Division was designated as a component of the JTF 190 ground combat element; the division staff was unable to execute staff responsibilities at two levels and required significant augmentation.⁸⁹

The other service components of JTF 190 included Destroyer Group 12, commanded by Rear Admiral Wright, Marine SPMAGTF Haiti, the 12th Air Force, the joint civil-military operations task force, reinforced with elements of the JTF 190 JSTOF and the CARICOM battalion.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Ibid, 94.

⁸⁹ United States Atlantic Command, 20.

⁹⁰ Ballard, 95.

The FAdH maintained uniformed end strength of approximately 8,000. Although this number included the end strength of the army, navy, air corps and police forces, the only real combat power in the country was vested in the army. The total force strength of the navy consisted of a few hundred men and one armed tug, nine small patrol craft and a presidential yacht; in September of 1993 none of the vessels were operational. The air corps consisted of an additional several hundred men with and inventory of seventeen fixed wing aircraft and eight helicopters, all aviation assets had been grounded for an indefinite period and the availability of trained pilots was questionable.⁹¹

The remainder of the FAdH was made up of army units and supported by various governmentally sanctioned and "private" paramilitary organizations made up of former VSN officers. The FAdH was organized into nine military departments and three regions; each department and region was made up of a commander and a small garrison of troops. The only garrison of numerical significance was located in Port-au-Prince and was augmented by a separate Presidential Guards Battalion and the Port-au-Prince police force.⁹²

⁹¹ Library of Congress, Federal Research Division , 368.

⁹² Ibid, 369.

The FAdH was equipped primarily with M1 Garand service rifles and various small arms. The Presidential Guards Battalion was equipped with M16 rifles and Uzi submachine guns as well as the vast majority of the countries ageing stock of crew served weapons, including: .30-caliber Browning M1919 machineguns, .50-caliber M2HB machine guns, M40 106mm recoilless rifles and an assortment of 60mm and 81mm mortars. In addition to their personal arms and crew served weapons the Presidential Guards Battalion three M2 armored personnel carriers and various obsolete artillery pieces. The FAdH's overall proficiency was negligible and training standards were nonexistent throughout the force.⁹³

U.S. command relationships were relatively straight forward during campaign planning but became quite complicated during the execution of the operation. Initially planned as three separate forces, with three individual commanders, last minute changes in the strategic environment dramatically complicated U.S. command relationships. The knowledge of senior U.S. ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of JSOTF forces and those of many of the civilian agencies that supported the operation led, at times, to poor command decisions at the tactical level.⁹⁴ An uncertain political policy created the need to modify rules of

⁹³ Ibid, 369.

⁹⁴ Ballard, 95.

engagement (ROE) on a regular basis as the strategic objectives changed. Additionally, the concern over force protection, at the strategic level, impacted on the ability of tactical commanders to accomplish their mission.

Haitian command relationships were characterized by authoritarian leadership. All decisions were made by the military leadership in Port-au-Prince and subordinate commanders were given little or no margin for independent action. Although authority was centralized, the FAdH did not have a robust command and control system and commanders were unable to receive guidance or direction from higher. FAdH commanders were routinely allowed to access U.S. operational communications links to communicate with their superiors once the focus of the operation became the development of a security environment.

The U.S. forces allocated for the assault and follow on elements of OPLAN 2370 and those designated to support security operations under OPLAN 2380 dramatically out numbered and out gunned the FAdH and there paramilitary supporters. At its high point, the number of U.S. forces in country approached 20,000 to a generous estimate of 8,000 FAdH troops.⁹⁵ Even more dramatic than this overwhelming numerical superiority was the level of training and technological advantage possessed by U.S. forces.

The vast majority of FAdH troops had received little if any formal military training while U.S. forces had trained for and experienced both direct combat and operations other than war environments. The U.S. commanders and troops were confident in the abilities of their forces while the FAdH commanders were always uncertain of the loyalty of there troops.

Technologically the FAdH was unable to match the firepower of a single U.S. rifle company and ill prepared to defend against overwhelming force. Morally the U.S. forces were convinced of the legitimacy of their cause, despite the misgivings of some elements of the U.S. political establishment. FAdH troops were fearful of their own people and simply looking for the most assured route of survival.

The campaign design process for Operation Uphold Democracy was hindered by two key factors. First, at the early stages of the plans development security around the planning process was extremely tight, much of the expertise that both the JCS and USACOM planning cells needed was not accessible due to the stringent security precautions imposed by CJCS. Secondly, ongoing efforts to broker a diplomatic solution led to the requirement to develop two initial plans, OPLAN 2370 and 2380. On the 6th of January 1994 General Sheehan, the J-3 for the JCS, approved the outlines for three broad options presented by

⁹⁵ United States Atlantic Command, 9.

USACOM and provided additional planning guidance that directed the use of a large force focused on Port-au-Prince and the creation of a safe area in Haiti for returning and processing detained migrants. On January 7, USACOM stood up General Shelton's headquarters as JTF 180 and provided initial operational level planning guidance for planning purposes.⁹⁶

The JTF 180 planners designed a campaign that would utilize overwhelming force to neutralize the FAdH and seize key infrastructure points that would facilitate the flow of logistical sustainment. One problem that arose during the design process was the focus on initial entry operations, in particular the airborne phases of the operation, at the expense of detailed plans for fulfilling the NCA's directive to establish a secure environment for the return of the Haitian president. Although the Marines were assigned to secure Cape Haitien and represented a significant portion of the JTF's early combat power, and were in fact later designated as the JTF's reserve, the staff gave little thought to coordination between the two forces. Additionally, beyond determining that JSOTF forces would conduct operations to secure the FAdH headquarters and numerous small garrisons across the remainder of the country

⁹⁶ Ballard, 66.

little time was spent planning for the support of these detachments.⁹⁷

The campaign plan that finally evolved into OPLAN 2370 called for a parachute assault by the 82nd Airborne Division into Port-au-Prince conducted simultaneously with SPMAGTF Haiti amphibious landings in Cape Haitien and a JSOTF led assault on the FAdH headquarters in Port-au-Prince. Initial combat operations were to be completed in 96 hours. From D+2 through D+45 JTF 180 forces would concentrate on establishing civil-military operations and preparing to hand over control to JTF 190, envisioned as a multinational force built around 10th Mountain Division. The follow on forces would provide a secure environment for the return of President Aristide and support security operations designed to facilitate handing over the mission to a U.N. military and police observer mission. The U.S. would provide support to the U.N mission but the majority of forces would come from other member nations.⁹⁸

As planning for OPLAN 2370 continued USACOM, directed by NCA, begin preparing plans for a benign entry option. OPLAN 2380 was based on the assumption that the military junta would step down and U.S. forces would be invited into Haiti by the legitimate government to provide security assistance. OPLAN

⁹⁷ Major General Tom Jones, USMC, interview by author, 14 November 2001.

⁹⁸ Ballard, 69.

2380 was designed as a stability and security operation that would provide for a six-month presence of JTF 190 in the country and then a turn over of mission responsibilities to a U.N. mission.⁹⁹

On 10 September the Haitian campaign, Operation Uphold Democracy, begin to quickly move toward execution guided by OPLAN 2370. USACOM activated a Haitian Crises Action Team (CAT) and team members begin manning the commands joint operations center 24-hours a day. Under USACOM guidance JTF 180 deployed the 1st Brigade Combat Team and the aviation brigade for embarkation aboard the *USS EISENHOWER*, a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. An additional carrier was chopped to Vice Admiral Johnson, commander of the 2nd fleet and the U.S. Transportation Command begin to send aircraft to Pope Air force Base in preparation for the airborne assault and follow on logistics support.¹⁰⁰

On 11 September the first advance force operations were conducted with a psychological operations leaflet drop centered on Port-au-Prince. At this time, D-day had not been set by NCA. On 12 September, CICUSACOM approved OPLAN 2370 which became Operations Order (OPORD) 2370-95. Following USACOM approval of OPLAN 2370, the *USS EISENHOWER* began embarking elements of the

⁹⁹ Ibid, 73.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 91.

10th Mountain Division and the JSOTF battlestaff embarked aboard the second carrier *USS AMERICA*. On 15 September, USACOM confirmed that SPMAGTF Haiti would be used to secure Cape Haitian and CJTF 190 directed that the 10th Mountain forces embarked on the *USS AMERICA* would become the JTF 190 reserve. This action created some confusion since the forces on the *USS AMERICA* were assigned to JTF 190, which at the time was preparing to either follow JTF 180 into Port-au-Prince or execute OPLAN 2380 independently of JTF 180.¹⁰¹

With the confusion created by the assignment of JTF 190 forces as the JTF 180 reserve USACOM determined on 17 September that OPLAN 2370 and 2380 would be merged and a compromise plan OPLAN 2375 was created. OPLAN 2375 designated CJTF 180 as the senior commander of both JTF 180 and 190 and begin the process of deconflicting logistical, command and support relationships. As U.S. forces begin to deploy to the theater the President sent a diplomatic team to Haiti in a final attempt to broker a deal prior to execution of the invasion.¹⁰²

The President's diplomatic team, headed by former President Carter, included General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn. While the Carter delegation was meeting with Cedras NCA issued execution orders setting D-day and H-hour for 00:00 18

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 91.

¹⁰² Ibid, 99.

September. Seven hours before H-hour the delegation reached an agreement that was approved two hours later by President. By the time USACOM ordered a termination of operations the assault elements of JTF 180 were in the air or preparing to embark aboard amphibious landing craft. The entire operation was stopped cold and soldiers and Marines returned to ships and stations to wait on follow on orders. Afloat on the *USS MOUNT WHITNEY*, the JTF staffs issued a new ROE reflecting a begin environment and prepared to land the forces available for a permissive entry - the JTF 190 reserve aboard the *USS EISENHOWER* and SPAGTF Haiti.¹⁰³

At 09:40 on 20 September, the first wave of U.S helicopters landed at Port-au-Prince International Airport and General Shelton had his first meeting with General Cedras to establish the conditions for the arrival and deployment of U.S. and multinational security forces. U.S. forces continued to flow into through D+5 with initial objectives aimed at establishing secure bases and beginning civil-military operations aimed at preparing to dismantle the FAdH. Although General Shelton had taken a hard line with General Cedras the FAdH's actions against Haitians and potential for hostile actions against U.S. Forces continued to concern commanders.¹⁰⁴ On 24 September the

¹⁰³ Ibid, 97.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 108.

operations first significant tactical operation occurred when a Marine patrol in Cape Haitian engaged the FAdH garrison functioning as the local police force in Cape Haitian. The Marines killed 10 FAdH members and the police garrison was ransacked by the local population. From this point on the FAdH collapsed and U.S. forces were authorized to intervene in Haitian on Haitian violence.¹⁰⁵

U.S. forces continued to disarm the FAdH and establish a secure environment through the 3 October when an International Police Monitoring Force (IPM) begins conducting operations with the Port-au-Prince police. On 13 October, General Cedras left Haiti for asylum in Panama, a key factor in the Carter agreement and President Aristide returned to Haiti on 14 October. Six days later SPMAGTF Haiti turned control of Cape Haitian over to elements of the 10th Mountain Division and USACOM directed the redeployment of JTF 180. JTF 190 was designated Multination Force Haiti (MNF) and CJTF 190 assumed command of the theater.¹⁰⁶

The MNF continued to support humanitarian operations, civil support activities, such as road and school construction and maintain the security of the country. During this period, 10th Mountain Division was relieved by the 25th Infantry Division and command of the MNF was passed to Major General Fisher. On 31

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 114.

¹⁰⁶ United States Atlantic Command , 19.

March, the MNF officially passed responsibility for Haiti to the UNMIH.¹⁰⁷

"The U.S. military demonstrated it could complete its part of the mission in Haiti by establishing a safe and secure environment. However, the long term stability in that country must be addressed by other U.S government departments and agencies."¹⁰⁸ Operationally the U.S. military achieved the objectives provided by the President and Secretary of Defense. The military regime that had toppled the elected government was removed from power, a relatively secure environment was developed that facilitated the return of President Aristide, the FAdH was neutralized as a threat to the government and the Haitian people and the flow of illegal migrants was dramatically reduced. These objectives were achieved without destroying the FAdH in combat and without negative impact on the civilian population.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 20.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 60.

POST INTERVENTION PROGRESS AND DECLINE

While an operational success strategically the U.S. failed to resolve the potential problem, that Haiti presents to U.S. security interest. Since 1995 illegal immigration from Haiti has risen, at times approaching the levels prior to the execution of Uphold Democracy. The infrastructure projects undertaken by U.S. forces as part of the overall civil-military strategy have begun to decline through neglect. The politically neutral police force created by IPMs and ICETAP training programs has returned to a position of power broker within the Haitian political process. Today Haiti is a transshipment point for narcotics traffickers and the most recent national elections were not certified by the U.N. as fair and free from fraud. Operation Uphold Democracy provided Haiti with a glimmer of hope for a brighter future but U.S. domestic political concerns ended the mission well before strategic success was possible.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Mr. Pat Murphy, Haitian Working Group, US Department of State, interview by author, 30 September 2001.

CONCLUSIONS

Haiti emerged from colonial rule with a unique set of political and social institutions that would have an impact on the future of the country as well as the ability of the United States to rectify persistent political and economic issues that would continue to make this small island nation a strategic security concern of the United States. Failure to understand these conditions, whose foundations were set in place over one hundred years before the first United States intervention in Haiti would hamper the long-term success of both the 1915 and 1994 operations.

Haitian experiences as slaves created a social condition that dictated that status was conferred on those who did little or no manual labor. The ability to avoid manual work and the disdain that those who were forced to labor were held by those who were not was and remains completely foreign to the United States. The Haitian model of success is one hundred and eighty degrees out from the yeoman farmer venerated in American Society.

The dramatic stratification of Haitian colonial society based on skin tone and the unique place that the mulattos held in this era created a system of social value based strictly on skin tone. Attitudes were, and remain, far more similar to the Indian caste than to the American experience either race. In

both 1915 and 1994 Americans could not understand that a particular political candidate or leader could and would be discounted by large segments of society simply because he was too black or too white.

The conditions and history of the slave trade in Haiti and the force required to secure independence left a strong mistrust of white society. The United States did not recognize Haiti until Grants presidency because to do so would have been to legitimize slave rebellion. The Haitians maintain a distrust of whites in general and of French and Americans in particular. This mistrust remains deep-seated in the minds of the Haitian people and effects their perceptions of the actions of both Europe and the United States to this day.

Beyond the social conditions that were created by Haiti's colonial history the political system that evolved was one of power through the barrel of a gun and rampant corruption. Aligning oneself with the perceived strongman was, and remains, the central issue of the Haitian political process. Until a challenger demonstrates that he has the power to remove the existing regime, the people will remain at best ambivalent and at worst openly hostile to change, despite the ineptness of the existing government. Haiti does not have a George Washington, a man who turned down the opportunity to be king rather it has a colonial history of warriors and survival of the fittest.

While operationally successful, U.S. military operations in Haiti in both 1915 and 1994 failed to achieve a long-term resolution of Haiti's internal problems as well as the threat that this small country presents to U.S. national security interest. Unity of effort is a principal of war operationally practiced by the military in both operations, however, in considering the military as one element of national power the United States as a whole failed in both cases. While the military effectively executed peacemaking operations, the U.S. as a nation failed in peacebuilding.¹¹⁰ Military forces capably executed air, sea and ground operations that effectively restored order and placed a democratically elected president in power however upon the disengagement of forces the country rapidly returned to the status quo. Politically and operationally, it is impractical for the U.S. to occupy a country for long periods. Without the engagement of other elements of national power, the gains made by military operations will quickly be lost.

In Haiti, the U.S. turned to military power to quickly eliminate a both a threat to the nation's security, in 1915 the threat was economic while in 1994 the treat was an influx of refugees, and relieve the suffering of the Haitian people. While

¹¹⁰ Peacemaking is defined as those actions that end a conflict; peacebuilding refers to those actions that rebuild a country.

military operations were successful, follow on operations were not and today Haiti retains the potential to implode into crises.

Mission creep, the expansion of a military mission beyond its originally stated objectives, was a serious concern in both interventions in Haiti. Because the U.S. government was unable to formulate a long-term strategy for success the President and Secretary of Defense tended to expand the military's mission as a stop gap measure while seeking to define the terms and conditions that would define victory. Military civic action programs were employed with some success as a method of engaging the Haitian population but without a long term plan these programs were piecemealed and proved to have little to no lasting impact on the future of the country.

While less of an issue in 1915, primarily due to the pace of media reporting, rules of engagement and restraint of military power affected both operations. In 1994, the FAdH remained a threat to U.S. operations until the firefight in Cap Haitien. In 1915, the Cacao uprisings constituted a similar threat. In both cases, the military was restrained by political concerns over the perceptions of the American public over the use of military force. The concern directly reflects the inability of the nations political leadership to define both the goals and desired end-state of the operation.

Perhaps the most disastrous element of operations in Haiti has been the United State's disengagement strategy. Without the ability to determine an end-state, both operations were terminated for political reasons with little to no thought into the long term impact or timing of the removal of military forces from Haiti. Conflict termination, particularly in operations other than war, is one of the keys to long-term success. In Haiti, the U.S. has quite simply declared victory and gone home.

Without an end-state, supporting efforts by other elements of national power and a long-term non-military engagement plan the U.S. will likely revisit Haiti and other states that are in crises. The key to ensuring the success of operations in failed or failing states lies with the execution of "joint" operations involving military power as only an element of the total effort aimed at an identified and obtainable goal. The engagement of all the elements of national power will not only provide a greater opportunity for a lasting victory but will increase the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of the public and the world.

While exact figures are not available the U.S. has expended a great deal of national treasure in Haiti. The combined cost of military operations in 1915 and 1994 are staggering and the long-term prospects for both Haiti and the threat it presents to U.S. security interest remain bleak.

The United States is the remaining super power in a world that is increasingly inter-connected politically and economically by robust transportation and information lines of communication. In order to ensure the nations security the U.S. must be willing to intervene in states that have failed or are failing not only with military power but also with the resources of the nation. Partial solutions for the sake of expediency have not nor will they ever be successful in resolving the problems these states present.

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